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Abstract
We study a general task allocation problem, involving
multiple agents that collaboratively accomplish tasks
and where agents may fail to successfully complete
the tasks assigned to them (known as execution uncer-
tainty). The goal is to choose an allocation that max-
imises social welfare while taking their execution uncer-
tainty into account. We show that this can be achieved
by using the post-execution verification (PEV)-based
mechanism if and only if agents’ valuations satisfy a
multilinearity condition. We then consider a more com-
plex setting where an agent’s execution uncertainty is
not completely predictable by the agent alone but ag-
gregated from all agents’ private opinions (known as
trust). We show that PEV-based mechanism with trust
is still truthfully implementable if and only if the trust
aggregation is multilinear.
Introduction
We study a general task allocation problem, where
multiple agents collaboratively accomplish a set of
tasks. However, agents may fail to successfully com-
plete the task(s) allocated to them (known as execu-
tion uncertainty). Such task allocation problems arise in
many real-world applications such as transportation net-
works (Sandholm 1993), data routing (Roughgarden 2007),
cloud computing (Armbrust et al. 2010) and sharing econ-
omy (Belk 2014). Execution uncertainty is typically un-
avoidable in these applications due to unforeseen events and
limited resources, especially sharing economy applications
such as Uber and Freelancer, where services are mostly pro-
vided by individuals with no qualifications or certifications.
In addition to the execution uncertainty underlying the
task allocation problem, the completion of a task may also
depend on the completion of other tasks, e.g., in Uber a rider
cannot ride without a driver offering the ride. The comple-
tion of the tasks of an allocation gives a (private) value to
each agent, and our goal is to choose an allocation of tasks
that maximises the total value of all agents, while taking
their execution uncertainty into account.
It has been shown that traditional mechanism de-
sign (based on Groves mechanisms (Groves 1973)) is
not applicable to settings that involve execution uncer-
tainty (Porter et al. 2008; Conitzer and Vidali 2014). This is
because execution uncertainty implies interdependencies be-
tween the agents’ valuations (e.g., a rider’s value for a ride
will largely depend on whether the driver will successfully
finish the drive). To combat the problem, Porter et al. (2008)
have proposed a solution based on post-execution verifica-
tion (PEV), which is broadly aligned with type verifica-
tion (Nisan and Ronen 2001). The essential idea of the PEV-
based mechanism is that agents are paid according to their
task executions, rather than what they have reported.
While Porter et al. (2008) considered a single task re-
quester setting where one requester has multiple tasks that
can be completed by multiple workers, Stein et al. (2011)
and Conizter and Vidali (2014) studied similar settings but
considering workers’ uncertain task execution time. More-
over, Ramchurn et al. (2009) looked at a more complex set-
ting where each agent is a task requester and is also capa-
ble to complete some tasks for the others. Except for dif-
ferent settings, all the solutions in these studies are PEV-
based. However, these results may not applicable in other
different problem settings where, for example, agents’ valu-
ations may have externalities, e.g., agent A prefers working
with B to others (Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti 1999),
and an agent may even incur some costs without doing
any task, e.g., a government is building a costly public
good (Maniquet and Sprumont 2010).
Therefore, in this paper, we study a more general task
allocation setting where agents’ valuations are not con-
strained. Under this general setting, we characterise the
applicability of the PEV-based mechanism. We show that
the PEV-based mechanism is applicable (truthfully imple-
mentable) if and only if agents are risk-neutral with re-
spect to their execution uncertainty. Moreover, we consider
a more complex setting where an agent’s ability to success-
fully complete a task is judged by all agents’ private opin-
ion (known as trust) as proposed by (Ramchurn et al. 2009).
Trust-based information exists in many real-world appli-
cations and plays an important role in decision mak-
ing (Aberer and Despotovic 2001). We show that the PEV-
based mechanism is still applicable with trust if and only
if the trust aggregation is multilinear. This characterisation
can help in designing efficient mechanisms for task alloca-
tion problems that have not been addressed yet.
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Allocations:
Figure 1: Package delivery from S to D with two agents 1, 2
agent allocation pi vi
1
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τ ′ pτ
′
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′, pτ
′
) = 0
2
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τ ) = pτ1 × p
τ
2
τ ′ pτ
′
2 = 0.5 v2(τ
′, pτ
′
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′
2
Table 1: A valuation setting for the exmaple in Figure 1
The Model
We study a task allocation problem where there are n agents
denoted by N = {1, ..., n} and a finite set of task allocations
T 1. Each allocation τ ∈ T is defined by τ = (τi)i∈N , where
τi is a set of tasks assigned to agent i. Let τi = ∅ if there is no
task assigned to i in τ . For each allocation τ , agent i may fail
to successfully complete her tasks τi, which is modelled by
pτi ∈ [0, 1], the probability that i will successfully complete
her tasks τi. Let pi = (pτi )τ∈T be i’s probability of success(PoS) profile for all allocations T , and pτ = (pτi )i∈N be the
PoS profile of all agents for allocation τ .
Note that the completion of one task in an allocation may
depend on the completion of the other tasks. Take the deliv-
ery example in Figure 1 with two agents 1, 2 delivering one
package from S to D. There are two possible task alloca-
tions to finish the delivery: τ is collaboratively executed by
agents 1 and 2, while τ ′ is done by agent 2 alone. It is clear
that task τ2 depends on τ1. However, pτ2 only indicates 2’s
PoS for τ2, assuming that 1 will successfully complete τ1.
That is, pτi does not include task dependencies and it only
specifies i’s probability to successfully complete τi, if τi is
ready for i to execute.
For each allocation τ ∈ T , the completion of τ brings
each agent i a value (either positive or negative), which com-
bines costs and benefits. For example, building a train station
near one’s house may costs one’s money as well as a peace-
ful living environment, but it may reduce the inconvenience
of commuting. Considering the execution uncertainty, agent
i’s valuation is modelled by a function vi : T×[0, 1]N → R,
which assigns a value for each allocation τ , for each PoS
profile pτ = (pτi )i∈N .
For each agent i, we assume that vi and pi are pri-
vately observed by i, known as i’s type and denoted by
θi = (vi, pi). Let θ = (θi)i∈N be the type profile of all
agents, θ−i be the type profile of all agents except i, and
1
T is the task allocation outcome space, which may contain
all feasible task allocations that agents can execute. The precise
definition depends on the applications.
θ = (θi, θ−i). Let Θi be i’s type space, Θ = (Θi)i∈N and
Θ−i = (Θj)j 6=i∈N .
Given the above setting, our goal is to choose one task al-
location from T that maximises all agents’ valuations, i.e., a
socially optimal allocation. This can be achieved (according
to the revelation principle (Myerson 2008)) by designing a
mechanism that directly asks all agents to report their types
and then chooses an allocation maximising their valuations.
However, agents may not report their types truthfully. There-
fore, we need to incentivize them to reveal their true types,
which is normally achieved by choosing a specific allocation
of tasks and an associated monetary transfer to each agent.
The direct revelation allocation mechanism is defined by a
task allocation choice function pi : Θ → T and a payment
function x = (x1, ..., xn) where xi : Θ→ R is the payment
function for agent i.
Solution Concepts
The goal of the allocation mechanism is to choose a task
allocation that maximises the valuation of all agents, i.e.,
the social welfare. Since the agents’ types are privately ob-
served by the agents, the mechanism is only able to max-
imise social welfare if it can receive their true types. There-
fore, the mechanism needs to incentivize all agents to report
their types truthfully. Moreover, agents should not lose when
they participate in the task allocation mechanism, i.e., they
are not forced to join the allocation. In the following, we
formally define these concepts.
We say an allocation choice pi is efficient if it always
chooses an allocation that maximises the expected social
welfare for all type report profiles.
Definition 1. Allocation choice pi is efficient if and only if
for all θ ∈ Θ, for all τ ′ ∈ T , let τ = pi(θ), we have:∑
i∈N
vi(τ, p
τ ) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(τ
′, pτ
′
)
where pτ = (pτi )i∈N , and pτ
′
= (pτ
′
i )i∈N .
Note that the expected social welfare calculated by pi is
based on the agents’ reported types, which are not necessar-
ily their true types. However, agents’ actual/realized valua-
tion for an allocation only depends on their true types.
Given the agents’ true type profile θ, their reported type
profile θˆ and the allocation mechanism (pi, x), agent i’s ex-
pected utility is quasilinear and defined as:
ui(θi, pi(θˆ), xi(θˆ), p
pi(θˆ)) = vi(pi(θˆ), p
pi(θˆ))− xi(θˆ),
where ppi(θˆ) = (ppi(θˆ)i )i∈N is agents’ true PoS profile for task
pi(θˆ) and pˆpi(θˆ) = (pˆpi(θˆ)i )i∈N is what they have reported.
Definition 2. Mechanism (pi, x) is individually rational
if for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ, for all θˆ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ui(θi, pi(θi, θˆ−i), xi(θi, θˆ−i), p
pi(θi,θˆ−i)) ≥ 0.
That is, an agent never receives a negative expected utility
in an individually rational mechanism if she reports truth-
fully, no matter what others report.
Furthermore, we say the mechanism is truthful (aka
dominant-strategy incentive-compatible) if it always max-
imises an agent’s expected utility if she reports her type
truthfully no matter what the others report, i.e., reporting
type truthfully is a dominant strategy. It has been shown that
truthful and efficient mechanism is impossible to achieve in
a special settings of the model (Porter et al. 2008). Instead
we focus on a weaker solution concept (but still very valid)
called ex-post truthful, which requires that reporting truth-
fully maximises an agent’s expected utility, if everyone else
also reports truthfully (i.e., reporting truthfully is an ex-post
equilibrium).
Definition 3. Mechanism (pi, x) is ex-post truthful if and
only if for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ, for all θˆi ∈
Θi, we have ui(θi, pi(θi, θ−i), xi(θi, θ−i), ppi(θi,θ−i))) ≥
ui(θi, pi(θˆi, θ−i), xi(θˆi, θ−i), p
pi(θˆi,θ−i)).
Failure of the Groves Mechanism
The Groves mechanism is a well-known class of mech-
anisms that are efficient and truthful in many do-
mains (Groves 1973). However, they are not directly appli-
cable in our domain due to the interdependent valuations
created by the execution uncertainty. As we will see later,
a simply variation of the Groves mechanism can solve the
problem. In the following, we briefly introduce the Groves
mechanism and show why it cannot be directly applied.
Given agents’ type report profile θ, Groves mechanisms
compute an efficient allocation pi∗(θ) (pi∗ denotes the effi-
cient allocation choice function) and charge each agent i
xGrovesi (θ) = hi(θ−i)− V−i(θ, pi
∗) (1)
where
• hi is a function that only depends on θ−i,
• V−i(θ, pi
∗) =
∑
j 6=i vj(pi
∗(θ), ppi
∗(θ)) is the social wel-
fare for all agents, excluding i, under the efficient alloca-
tion pi∗(θ).
Since hi is independent of i’s report, we can set hi(θ−i) =
0, and then each agent’s utility is vi(pi∗(θ)) + V−i(θ, pi∗),
which is the social welfare of the efficient allocation. The
following example shows that the Groves mechanism is not
directly applicable in our task allocation setting.
Take the example from Figure 1 with the setting from Ta-
ble 1. If both 1 and 2 report truthfully, the efficient alloca-
tion is τ ′ with social welfare 0.5 (which is also their utility
if hi(θ−i) = 0). Now if 1 misreported pˆτ1 > 0.5, then the
efficient allocation will be τ with social welfare pˆτ1 > 0.5,
i.e., 1 can misreport to receive a higher utility.
Applicability of PEV-Based Mechanisms
As shown in the last section, the Groves mechanisms are
not directly applicable due to the interdependency of agents’
valuations created by their probability of success (PoS). The
other reason is that the Groves payment is calculated from
agents’ reported PoS rather than their realized/true PoS.
The fact is that we can partially verify their reported PoS
by delaying their payments until they have executed their
tasks (post-execution verification). To utilize this fact, Porter
et al. (2008) have proposed a variation of the Groves mecha-
nism which pays an agent according to their actual task com-
pletion, rather than what they have reported. More specifi-
cally, we define two payments for each agent: a reward for
successful completion and a penalty for non-completion. Let
us call this mechanism PEV-based mechanism.
Porter et al. (2008) have considered a simple setting where
there is one requester who has one or multiple tasks to be al-
located to multiple workers each of whom have a fixed cost
to attempt each task. Later, Ramchurn et al. (2009) extended
Porter et al.’s model to a multiple-requester setting (a com-
binatorial task exchange) and especially considered trust in-
formation which will be further studied later in this paper.
Our setting generalises both models and allows any types of
valuations and allocations. In the following, we formally de-
fine the PEV-based mechanism and analyse its applicability
in our general domain.
Given the agents’ true type profile θ and their reports θˆ, let
pτ−i be the true PoS profile of all agents except i for task τ ,
pτ = (pτi , p
τ
−i), and pˆτ−i, pˆτ be the corresponding reported,
PEV-based payment xPEV for each agent i is defined as:
xPEVi (θˆ) =
{
hi(θˆ−i)− V 1−i(θˆ, pi
∗) if i succeeded,
hi(θˆ−i)− V 0−i(θˆ, pi
∗) if i failed.
(2)
where
• hi(θˆ−i) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
∗(θˆ−i), (0, pˆ
pi∗(θˆ−i)
−i )) is the
maximum expected social welfare that the other agents
can achieve without i’s participation,
• V 1−i(θˆ, pi
∗) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
∗(θˆ), (1, p
pi∗(θˆ)
−i )) is the re-
alized expected social welfare of all agents except i under
the efficient allocation pi∗(θˆ) when ppi
∗(θˆ)
i = 1, i.e., i suc-
ceeded. V 0−i(θˆ, pi∗) =
∑
j∈N\{i} vˆj(pi
∗(θˆ), (0, p
pi∗(θˆ)
−i )) is
the corresponding social welfare when ppi
∗(θˆ)
i = 0.
Note that hi(θˆ−i) is calculated according to what agents
have reported, while V 1−i(θˆ, pi∗), V 0−i(θˆ, pi∗) are based on the
realization of their task completion, which is actually their
true PoS as we used in the calculation. xPEVi pays/rewards
agent i the social welfare increased by i if she completed her
tasks, otherwise penalizes her the social welfare loss due to
her failure.
Porter et al. (2008) have shown that the mechanism
(pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful and individually rational if
the dependencies between tasks are non-cyclical. In Theo-
rem 1, we show that (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful in gen-
eral if agents’ valuations satisfy a multilinearity condition
(Definition 4), which generalizes the non-cyclical task de-
pendencies condition applied in (Porter et al. 2008).
Definition 4. Valuation vi of i is multilinear in PoS if for all
type profiles θ ∈ Θ, for all allocations τ ∈ T , for all j ∈ N ,
vi(τ, p
τ ) = pτj ×vi(τ, (1, p
τ
−j))+(1−p
τ
j )×vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)).
Intuitively, vi is multilinear in PoS if all its variables but
pτj are held constant, vi is a linear function of pτj , which
also means that agent i is risk-neutral (with respect to j’s
execution uncertainty). However, multilinearity in PoS does
not indicate that vi has to be a linear form of vi(τ, pτ ) =
b+ a1p
τ
1 + ...+ anp
τ
n, where b, ai are constant (see Table 1
for example).
Multilinearity in PoS is Sufficient for Truthfulness
Theorem 1. Mechanism (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful if
for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS.
Proof. According to the characterization of truthful mech-
anisms given by Proposition 9.27 from (Nisan et al. 2007),
we need to prove that for all i ∈ N , for all θ ∈ Θ:
1. xPEVi (θ) does not depend on i’s report, but only on the
task allocation alternatives;
2. i’s utility is maximized by reporting θi truthfully if the
others report θ−i truthfully.
From the definition of xPEVi in (2), we can see that given
the allocation pi∗(θ), agent i cannot change V 1−i(θ, pi∗) and
V 0−i(θ, pi
∗) without changing the allocation pi∗(θ). There-
fore, xPEVi does not depend on i’s report, but only on the
task allocation outcome pi∗(θ).
In what follows, we show that for each agent i, if the oth-
ers report types truthfully, then i’s utility is maximized by
reporting her type truthfully.
Given an agent i’ of type θi and the others’ true type pro-
file θ−i, assume that i reported θˆi 6= θi. For the alloca-
tion τ = pi∗(θˆi, θ−i), according to xPEVi , when i finally
completes her tasks, i’s utility is u1i = vi(τ, (1, pτ−i)) −
hi(θ−i) + V
1
−i((θˆi, θ−i), pi
∗) and her utility if she fails is
u0i = vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−i)) − hi(θ−i) + V
0
−i((θˆi, θ−i), pi
∗). Note
that i’s expected valuation depends on her true valuation vi
and all agents’ true PoS. Therefore, i’s expected utility is:
pτi×u
1
i + (1− p
τ
i )× u
0
i =
pτi × vi(τ, (1, p
τ
−i)) (3)
+ (1− pτi )× vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−i)) (4)
+ pτi
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(τ, (1, p
τ
−i)) (5)
+ (1− pτi )
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(τ, (0, p
τ
−i)) (6)
− hi(θ−i).
Since all valuations are multilinear in PoS, the sum of (3)
and (4) is equal to vi(τ, pτ ), and the sum of (5) and (6) is∑
j∈N\{i} vj(τ, p
τ ). Thus, the sum of (3), (4), (5) and (6)
is the social welfare under allocation pi∗(θˆi, θ−i). The social
welfare is maximized when i reports truthfully because pi∗
maximizes social welfare (note that this is not the case when
θ−i is not truthfully reported). Moreover, hi(θ−i) is inde-
pendent of i’s report and is the maximum social welfare that
the others can achieve without i. Therefore, by reporting θi
truthfully, i’s utility is maximized.
Theorem 1 shows that multilinearity in PoS is suf-
ficient to truthfully implement (pi∗, xPEV ) in an ex-
post equilibrium (ex-post truthful), but not in a dom-
inant strategy (truthful). It has been shown in sim-
ilar settings that ex-post truthfulness is the best we
can achieve here (Porter et al. 2008; Ramchurn et al. 2009;
Stein et al. 2011; Conitzer and Vidali 2014).
Multilinearity in PoS is also Necessary
In the above we showed that multilinearity in PoS is suffi-
cient for (pi∗, xPEV ) to be ex-post truthful. Here we show
that the multilinearity is also necessary.
Theorem 2. If (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truthful for all type
profiles θ ∈ Θ, then for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that vi of agent of type θi
is not multilinear in PoS, i.e., there exist a θ−i, an allocation
τ ∈ T , and a j ∈ N (without loss of generality, assume that
j 6= i) such that:
vi(τ, p
τ ) 6= pτj × vi(τ, (1, p
τ
−j)) + (1− p
τ
j )× vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)) (7)
Under efficient allocation choice function pi∗, it is not hard
to find a type profile θˆ−i such that pi∗(θi, θˆ−i) = τ and the
PoS profile is the same between θ−i and θˆ−i. We can choose
θˆ−i by setting vˆj(τ, pτ ) to a sufficiently large value for each
j 6= i.
Applying (pi∗, xPEV ) on profile (θi, θˆ−i), when j fi-
nally successfully completes her tasks τj , her utility is
u1j = vˆj(τ, (1, p
τ
−j))−hj((θi, θˆ−i)−j)+V
1
−j((θi, θˆ−i), pi
∗)
and her utility if she fails is u0j = vˆj(τ, (0, pτ−j)) −
hj((θi, θˆ−i)−j) + V
0
−j((θi, θˆ−i), pi
∗). Thus, j’s expected
utility is (note that pˆτj = pτj ):
pτj×u
1
j + (1− p
τ
j )× u
0
j =
pτj × vi(τ, (1, p
τ
−j)) (8)
+ (1− pτj )× vi(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)) (9)
+ pτj
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, (1, p
τ
−j)) (10)
+ (1− pτj )
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, (0, p
τ
−j)) (11)
− hj(θ−j).
Given the assumption (7), terms (8) and (9) together can be
written as vi(τ, pτ ) + δi where δi = (8) + (9) − vi(τ, pτ ).
Similar substitutions can be carried out for all other agents
k ∈ N \ {i} in terms (10) and (11) regardless of whether vk
is mutlilinear in PoS. After this substitution, j’s utility can
be written as:
pj×u
1
j + (1 − pj)× u
0
j =
vi(τ, p
τ ) +
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τ, p
τ ) (12)
+
∑
k∈N
δk (13)
− hj(θ−j).
Now consider a suboptimal allocation τˆ 6= τ , if τˆ is chosen
by the mechanism, then j’s utility can be written as:
uˆj =
vi(τˆ , p
τˆ ) +
∑
k∈N\{i}
vˆk(τˆ , p
τˆ ) (14)
+
∑
k∈N
δˆk (15)
− hj(θ−j).
In the above two utility representations, we know that terms
(12) > (14) because pi∗ is efficient, but terms (13) and (15)
can be any real numbers.
In what follows, we tune the valuation of j such that the
optimal allocation is either τ or τˆ , and in either case j is
incentivized to misreport.
In the extreme case where all agents except i’s valuations
are multilinear in PoS, we have δk = 0, δˆk = 0 for all
k 6= i in (13) and (15). Therefore, ∑k∈N δk = δi 6= 0
and
∑
k∈N δˆk = δˆi (possibly = 0). It might be the case that
δi = δˆi, but there must exist a setting where δi 6= δˆi, oth-
erwise vi is multilinear in PoS, because constant δi for any
PoS does not violate the multilinearity definition.
1. If δi > δˆi, we have (12) + δi > (14) + δˆi. In this case,
we can increase vˆj(τˆ , pτˆ ) such that τˆ becomes optimal,
i.e., (12) < (14), but (12) + δi > (14) + δˆi still holds.
Therefore, if j’s true valuation is the one that chooses τˆ
as the optimal allocation, then j would misreport to get
allocation τ which gives her a higher utility.
2. If δi < δˆi, we can easily modify vˆj(τˆ , pτˆ ) such that (12)+
δi < (14) + δˆi but (12) > (14) still holds. In this case, if
j’s true valuation again is the one just modified, j would
misreport to get allocation τˆ with a better utility.
In both of the above situations, agent j is incentivized to mis-
report, which contradicts that (pi∗, xPEV ) is ex-post truth-
ful. Thus, vi has to be multilinear in PoS.
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 2 does not say that
given a specific type profile θ, all vi have to be multilinear in
PoS for (pi∗, xPEV ) to be ex-post truthful. Take the delivery
example from Table 1 and change agent 2’s valuation for
τ to be v2(τ, pτ ) = (pτ1)2 × pτ2 which is not multilinear
in PoS. It is easy to check that under this change, no agent
can gain anything by misreporting if the other agent reports
truthfully. However, given each agent i of valuation vi, to
truthfully implement (pi∗, xPEV ) in an ex-post equilibrium
for all possible type profiles of the others, Theorem 2 says
that vi has to be multilinear in PoS, otherwise, there exist
settings where some agent is incentivized to misreport.
Conditions for Achieving Individual Rationality
PEV-based mechanism is individually rational in Porter et
al. (2008)’s specific setting. However, in the general model
we consider here, it may not guarantee this property. For
example, there is an allocation where an agent has no task
to complete in an allocation, but has a negative valuation
for the completion of the tasks assigned to the others (i.e.
she is penalised if the others complete their tasks). If that
allocation is the optimal allocation and the allocation does
not change with or without that agent, then she will get a
zero payment therefore a negative utility.
Proposition 1 shows by restricting agents’ valuations to
some typical constraint, PEV-based mechanism can be made
individually rational. The constraint says if an agent is not
involved in a task allocation (i.e., when the tasks assigned to
her is empty), she will not be penalised by the completion of
the others’ tasks.
Proposition 1. Mechanism (pi∗, xPEV ) is individually ra-
tional if and only if for all i ∈ N , for all τ ∈ T , if τi = ∅,
then vi(τ, pτ ) ≥ 0 for any pτ ∈ [0, 1]N .
Proof. (If part) For all type profile θ ∈ Θ, for all i ∈ N ,
let τ = pi∗(θ) and τˆ = pi∗(θ−i), i’s utility is given by∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ ) −
∑
k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , p
τˆ
−i), where the first
term is the optimal social welfare with i’s participation and
the second term is the optimal social welfare without i’s par-
ticipation. It is clear that τˆi = ∅ as τˆ is the optimal allocation
without i’s participation.
∑
k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , p
τˆ
−i) + vi(τˆ , p
τˆ )
is the social welfare for allocation τˆ . Since τ is optimal,
we get that
∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ ) ≥
∑
k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , p
τˆ
−i) +
vi(τˆ , p
τˆ ). Thus,
∑
k∈N vk(τ, p
τ )−
∑
k∈N\{i} vk(τˆ , p
τˆ
−i) ≥
vi(τˆ , p
τˆ ) ≥ 0, i.e. i’s utility is non-negative.
(Only if part) If there exist an i of type θi, a τ , a pτ ∈
[0, 1]N such that τi = ∅ and vi(τ, pτ ) < 0. We can always
find a profile θˆ−i s.t. pˆτ = pτ and pi∗(θi, θˆ−i) = pi∗(θˆ−i) =
τ . It is clear that the payment for i is 0 and her utility is
vi(τ, p
τ ) < 0 (violates individual rationality).
Extension to Trust-Based Environments
So far, we have assumed that each agent can correctly pre-
dict her probability of success (PoS) for each task, but in
some environments, an agent’s PoS is not perfectly per-
ceived by the agent alone. Instead, multiple other agents may
have had prior experiences with a given agent and their expe-
riences can be aggregated to create a more informed measure
of the PoS for the given agent. This measure is termed the
trust in the agent (Ramchurn et al. 2009). Ramchurn et al.
have extended Porter et al.’s mechanism to consider agents’
trust information and showed that the extension is still truth-
fully implementable in their settings.
Similarly, our general model can also be extended to han-
dle the trust information by changing singleton pτi to be a
vector pτi = (p
τ
i,1, ..., p
τ
i,j , ..., p
τ
i,n) where pτi,j is the proba-
bility that i believes j will complete j’s tasks in τ . Agent
i’s aggregated/true PoS for task τ is given by a function
f τi : [0, 1]
N → [0, 1] with input (pτ1,i, ..., pτn,i). Given this
extension, for any type profile θ, let ρτi = f τi (pτ1,i, ..., pτn,i),
the social welfare of a task allocation τ is defined as:∑
i∈N
vi(τ, ρ
τ ) (16)
where ρτ = (ρτ1 , ..., ρτn).
As shown in (Ramchurn et al. 2009), PEV-based mecha-
nism can be extended to handle this trust information by sim-
ply updating the efficient allocation choice function pi∗ with
the social welfare calculation given by Equation (16). Let
us call the extended mechanism Mtrust. Ramchurn et al.
have demonstrated that Mtrust is ex-post truthful in their
settings when the PoS aggregation function is the following
linear form:
f τi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) =
∑
j∈N
ωj × p
τ
j,i (17)
where constant ωj ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
j∈N ωj = 1.
Following the results in Theorems 1 and 2, we general-
ize Ramchurn et al.’s results to characterize all aggregation
forms under which Mtrust is ex-post truthful.
Definition 5. A PoS aggregation fi = (f τi )τ∈T
is multilinear if for all j ∈ N , for all τ ∈
T , for all θ ∈ Θ, f τi (pτ1,i, ..., pτj,i, ..., pτn,i) =
pτj,i × f
τ
i (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
j−1,i, 1, p
τ
j+1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i) + (1 − p
τ
j,i) ×
f τi (p
τ
1,i, ..., p
τ
j−1,i, 0, p
τ
j+1,i, ..., p
τ
n,i).
Definition 5 is similar to the multilinear in PoS definition
given by Definition 4. Multilinear aggregations cover the lin-
ear form given by Equation (17), but also consist of many
non-linear forms such as
∏
j∈N p
τ
j,i. The following corol-
lary directly follows Theorems 1 and 2. We omit the proof
here. The basic idea of the proof is that given a multilinear
function, if we substitute another multilinear function (with
no shared variables) for one variable of the function, then
the new function must be multilinear.
Corollary 1. Trust-based mechanism Mtrust is ex-post
truthful if and only if for all i ∈ N , vi is multilinear in PoS,
and the PoS aggregation fi is multilinear.
For Mtrust to be individually rational, the constraint
specified in Proposition 1 is still sufficient and necessary,
if we change h−i in the payment definition (Equation (2))
to be the optimal social welfare that the others can achieve
without i, but assume that i offered the worst trust in the
others (see (Ramchurn et al. 2009) for more details).
Discussions
Link to General Interdependent Valuations
So far, we have characterised the applicability of PEV-based
mechanism and its extension with trust in a general task
allocation setting. We should also note that there exists a
body of research for general interdependent valuations such
as (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001).
Hence, in what follows we draw the parallels between the
two areas and compare and contrast their key results and as-
sumptions.
The work of (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001) is especially
interesting to this study, because they have identified a
necessary condition for implementing an efficient and
Bayes-Nash truthful2 mechanism (see Theorem 4.3 in
2Bayes-Nash truthful is weaker than ex-post truthful and it as-
sumes that all agents know the correct probabilistic distribution of
each agent’s type.
(Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001)). However, their setting and
the necessary condition do not apply to our setting, because:
1. The model in (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001) can only
model one special setting of our problem, namely the set-
ting where the tasks between agents are independent. Also
it is impossible to model trust at the same time.
2. The mechanism considered in
(Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001) has no ability to verify
agents’ reports.
Therefore, we can see that our problem is a very special in-
terdependent valuation setting, which allows the mechanism
to partially verify agents’ reports and to design mechanisms
with better performance.
When Agents are Not Risk-Neutral
We have shown that as soon as agents are risk-neutral with
respect to their execution uncertainty, PEV-based mecha-
nism is sufficient to provide incentives for agents to reveal
their true types. However, in many real-world applications,
participants are often not risk-neutral. For instance, when
we reserve a ride from a taxi/carsharing company to catch a
flight, we certainly do not want to take risk to get an unreli-
able booking. On the other hand, we often face challenging
tasks that are very unlikely to be successfully completed (for
example open research questions and financial investments),
but we are very willing to take risks to try. Our results indi-
cate that, to handle these non-risk-neutral settings, we need
better solutions.
Furthermore, when agents are not risk-neutral, individual
rationality (Definition 2) needs to be redefined, as the current
definition assumes that agents are risk-neutral with respect
to their execution uncertainty.
Challenge of the Efficient Allocation Design
In our model, we assumed that the set of possi-
ble task allocation outcomes are given and the effi-
cient task allocation is chosen from that set. It is
worth mentioning that given a specific task alloca-
tion setting, finding an efficient allocation may not
come so easy, e.g., (Ramchurn et al. 2009; Stein et al. 2011;
Feige and Tennenholtz 2011; Conitzer and Vidali 2014). If
it is computationally hard to get an efficient outcome, there
exist techniques to tackle it without violating the truthful-
ness properties, e.g., (Nisan and Ronen 2007).
Conclusions
We studied a general task allocation problem where multi-
ple agents collaboratively accomplish a set of tasks, but they
may fail to successfully complete tasks assigned to them.
To design an efficient task allocation mechanism for this
problem, we showed that post-execution verification based
mechanism is truthfully implementable, if and only if all
agents are risk-neutral with respect to their execution uncer-
tainty. We also showed that trust information between agents
can be integrated into the mechanism without violating its
properties, if and only if the trust information is aggregated
by a multilinear function. This characterisation will help us
further study specific task allocation settings. As mentioned
in the above discussions, one very interesting future work
is to design efficient mechanisms for task allocation settings
with non-risk-neutral participants.
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